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No One Knows the Date or the Hour: 
An Unorthodox Application 
of Rev. Bayes's Theorem 
Paul Barthat 
University of British Columbia 
Christopher Hitchcock 
Rice University 
Carter and Leslie (1996) have argued, using Bayes's theorem, that our being alive now 
supports the hypothesis of an early 'Doomsday'. Unlike some critics (Eckhardt 1997), 
we accept their argument in part: given that we exist, our existence now indeed favors 
'Doom sooner' over 'Doom later'. The very fact of our existence, however, favors 
'Doom later'. In simple cases, a hypothetical approach to the problem of 'old evidence' 
shows that these two effects cancel out: our existence now yields no information about 
the coming of Doom. More complex cases suggest a move from countably additive to 
non-standard probability measures. 
1. Introduction. As the millennium approaches, we are led to reflect on 
the ultimate fate of the universe, or perhaps just humankind. How will 
it all end? A meteor akin to the one that did in the dinosaurs? An 
epidemic that makes 1349 look like a mild flu season? For simplicity, 
let us collapse all such scenarios into just two hypotheses, which we 
call 'doom sooner' and 'doom later'. According to the 'doom sooner' 
hypothesis, Doomsday will occur in the next hundred years or so; in 
particular, it will occur at a time when approximately fifty billion 
people have lived. According to the 'doom later' hypothesis, Dooms- 
day will not occur until the distant future, let's say after forty quadril- 
lion people have lived on earth or in various parts of the galaxy. 
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Brandon Carter and John Leslie (1996) have argued, using Bayes's 
theorem, that the observation that we are alive now strongly supports 
the 'doom sooner' hypothesis. Leslie acknowledges that this result is 
counterintuitive. Indeed, when we reflect on probable doom scenarios, 
such as the consumption of the earth by the sun expanding under the 
force of fusion pressure, it is hard to see how our happening to live on 
the eve of the twenty-first century could have any evidential bearing 
whatsoever on the timing of Doom. We maintain that it does not, but 
that identifying the flaw in the Doomsday Argument brings out inter- 
esting points about the selection of prior probabilities and the 'ortho- 
dox' use of Bayes's theorem. 
The Doomsday Argument runs roughly as follows: 
1. I find myself among the first forty billion humans. 
2. Bayes's theorem tells us that an observation provides most sup- 
port for whichever hypothesis renders the observation least im- 
probable.' 
3. 'Doom sooner' makes it 80% probable that I will find myself 
among the first forty billion humans, since there will only ever 
be fifty billion. By contrast, 'doom later' renders my appearance 
among the first forty billion vastly improbable (one in a million, 
to be precise). 
4. So the observation that I am alive now provides a strong ar- 
gument for 'doom sooner'. 
To make the argument more vivid, Leslie asks us to imagine a lottery 
in which names printed on slips of paper are successively drawn from 
an urn without replacement. I am told that exactly one slip has my 
name on it, and that every name in the urn appears just once; further- 
more, each name has an equal chance of being selected on a given draw. 
This reflects a key assumption of the argument: that my own position 
or 'birth rank' in the sequence of all humans is more or less random. 
I further learn that one of two hypotheses is true: the urn contains 
either fifty names or forty million names. (The ratio is the same as in 
the example above, but the numbers are reduced by a factor of one 
billion.) Now suppose that my name appears among the first forty 
drawn. Then an application of Bayes's theorem shows that, whatever 
my prior probabilities for the two hypotheses, I should now revise them 
dramatically in favor of the hypothesis that there are fifty names. 
Call this the 'lottery' version of the Doomsday Argument. We shall 
1. This is an informal characterization of the role that likelihoods play in Bayes's The- 
orem, not an endorsement of any particular measure of degree of confirmation; see 
Fitelson 1999. 
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formulate and evaluate it more precisely in Section 3. There is also a 
second version of the Doomsday Argument which we call the 
'shooting-room' version, after a different analogy also developed by 
Leslie. This argument depends upon the supposition that the popula- 
tion increases at something like a geometric rate, so that a high pro- 
portion of those who have ever lived are alive at any given time. A 
current estimate is approximately 15%. Similarly, 15% of all those who 
ever live will be in the final, doomed generation which we shall call 
'generation Nix'. Since we have no reason to regard our own position 
in the sequence of human lives as special, we should put our own like- 
lihood of being in generation Nix at 15%. 
In this paper, we focus primarily on the 'lottery' version of the 
Doomsday Argument, but we wish to make a few remarks about the 
much-discussed shooting-room version by way of preparation. 
2. Shooting-Room Version of the Doomsday Argument. Imagine that a 
judge summons people to a place known as the shooting-room. He 
rolls two ordinary six-sided dice. If the result is double six, all those in 
the room are shot. On any other roll, the occupants of the shooting- 
room are free to leave, and the next group is summoned. 
This game has two unusual features. First, the groups are summoned 
to the room in increasingly large sizes: 
1, 9, 90, 900, 9000, 90000, ... 
Second, the game ends as soon as double six is rolled and the partici- 
pants in the current round of the game are shot. From these two facts 
it is apparent that (with probability one) at least 90% of those who 
ever participate in this game will be shot. (Apparently a 15% death rate 
was not high enough to attract philosophical attention!) Hence, con- 
cludes the argument, for any participant in the game, the probability 
of being in the final, fatal round is 0.9. 
There is an obvious objection to this argument. Assuming that 
participants in the game know that (1) they will be shot if and only if 
the dice come up double six, and (2) the chance of that is one in thirty- 
six, their subjective probability of being shot is one in thirty-six, rather 
than 0.9.2 
It is worth noting that Leslie first presents the shooting-room anal- 
ogy as an objection to the Doomsday Argument (Leslie 1996,235-236). 
Indeed, he acknowledges that the probability of death is one in thirty- 
six rather than .9 so long as the dice tosses are genuinely indetermin- 
2. Cognoscenti will note that this argument presupposes that subjective probabilities 
are in accord with Lewis's Principal Principle (see Lewis 1980). 
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istic. Curiously, he maintains that in a deterministic version of the 
shooting-room set-up, in which the outcomes of the dice throws are 
determined from the beginning, the argument for a 0.9 probability of 
being shot is valid. We shall not pursue this issue further here (see Leslie 
1996, 254ff.). 
It is instructive to see what is wrong with the inference from '90% 
of those who enter the room will die' to 'my probability of dying (given 
that I have entered the room) is .9.' This inference rests on the crucial 
assumption that we are not special with respect to the order in which 
we are summoned to the room. The problem here is that this assump- 
tion requires a uniform prior distribution over a countable infinity of 
possibilities, since we might be assigned any natural number as our 
selection position. If we assume that our probability measure is count- 
ably additive, then there is no such uniform prior distribution. 
Analogously, hypotheses postulating an early doom must be more 
probable than hypotheses postulating later doom. Let Dj represent the 
hypothesis that doom occurs in generation j. Let P(D1) represent the 
probability of doom in generation j, where P is a standard countably 
additive probability measure. By assumption, Xj7. 1P(D) = 1. It follows 
that for any small probability 8 > 0, there will be some n such that the 
probability that doom occurs in a generation later than n will be less 
than 8. This is clearly not the sort of argument in favor of early doom 
that Leslie has in mind. For one thing, it in no way depends upon our 
observing that we are alive now. 
De Finetti (1975) has famously argued against the condition of 
countable additivity on grounds similar to these. He argued that it 
ought to be rational to believe that every ticket in a countably infinite 
lottery has an equal chance of winning. We have shown in (Bartha and 
Hitchcock 1999) that if we abandon countable additivity and adopt a 
non-standard measure, then we can indeed find such a uniform prior 
distribution. Even then, however, it can be demonstrated that the sub- 
jective probability for death should remain 1 in 36. 
In short, we claim that the shooting-room version of the argument 
does not succeed; the detailed arguments are presented elsewhere. 
However, this does not undermine Leslie's main argument. In partic- 
ular, the 'lottery' version makes no illicit appeal to a uniform prior 
probability distribution. Indeed, our contention is that that argument 
involves a valid probabilistic inference, but is mistaken in its eschato- 
logical application. 
3. Lottery Version of the Doomsday Argument. 
3.1. Formulation of the Argument. We begin by making the argument 
sketched in the introduction more precise. Let D1 stand for 'doom 
This content downloaded from 131.215.71.79 on Tue, 8 Apr 2014 17:20:44 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
AN UNORTHODOX APPLICATION OF REV. BAYES S THEOREM S343 
sooner' (fifty billion humans) and D2 for 'doom later' (forty quadrillion 
humans), and let F stand for the observation that I am among the first 
forty billion humans. Let us assume that the prior probabilities P(D1) 
and P(D2) are 1% and 99%, respectively, so that we begin with the 
assumption that doom is much more likely to be remote. Then Bayes's 
theorem tells us: 
P(DI' F) P(FID1) * P(DI) 
-P(FID 1) P(D 1) + P(FID2) P(D2) 
(0.8)(0.01) 
(0.8)(0.01) + (0.000001)(0.99) 
= 0.9999 
and by a similar calculation, P(D2F) = 0.0001. Conditioning on F 
dramatically increases the probability of D1 at the expense of D2, no 
matter what prior probabilities we started with. So we have what Leslie 
calls a Bayesian shift in favor of early doom. 
To see more clearly how the argument works, let us generalize to 
allow for more than two hypotheses about Doomsday. We adopt the 
following notation: 
Dj: Doom occurs after preciselyj people have been born. 
Bi: My birth rank is i; i.e., I am the i'th person born. 
We make just two assumptions: 
1. Xjy 1P(D1) = 1 [Doom occurs] 
2. For each j and each i 'j, P(BilD) = 1/j; if i > j, then P(Bi1D1) 
- 0. [Lottery Assumption] 
The first assumption, that with probability 1 Doomsday (the end of 
the human race) will occur at some point, is unproblematic. The second 
assumption is the crucial one. It states the following: 
Conditional upon the assumption that exactly j people will be born 
before Doomsday arrives, I ought to assign a subjective probability 
1/j to my having any birth rank between 1 and j, and 0 for any 
higher rank. 
We call this the 'lottery assumption' because it implies that our sit- 
uation vis-a-vis Doomsday is precisely analogous to a lottery of un- 
known size in which each ticket has an equal chance of winning. Ticket 
number is analogous to birth rank; Dj is analogous to "j tickets are 
issued" and Bi to "my ticket number is i." The lottery assumption is 
quite plausible. It is just the idea that none of us is special with respect 
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to which ticket we get, or in the original problem, that none of us is 
special with respect to birth rank. 
It is easy to verify that, on either the lottery or Doomsday interpre- 
tation, we have 
00 
P(Bt) = Y (lIj)P(Dj).3 (1) 
J=i 
From assumptions 1 and 2, it follows via Bayes's Theorem that if i j, 
P(DjIB3) - P(BilDj) 
P(D1) P(B1) 
P(B)3; 
that is, given the information that my birth rank is i, each doom hy- 
pothesis Dj has its probability shifted by a factor 00 Since P(B,) is 
independent ofj, this value is inversely proportional toj. Note that the 
probability of the hypotheses Dj will increase for all values of j up to 
1 P(B) and decrease beyond that point. On finding that you have a low 
birth rank, you should revise your estimates in favor of early doom- 
just as, on finding a low number on your winning ticket, you should 
revise your estimates in favor of a small lottery. 
Some critics of the Doomsday Argument, most notably Eckhardt, 
have argued that there is no way to make sense of the 'lottery' as- 
sumption, which Eckhardt calls the human randomness (HR) assump- 
tion. He puts the assumption in the following form: 
We can validly consider our birth rank as generated by random or 
equiprobable sampling from the collection of all persons who ever 
live. (1997, 248) 
More precisely, his interpretation is this: 
P(B) = 1IM for i -A M, and 0 for i > M, 
where exactly M people will ever be born before Doomsday arrives. 
Such an assignment is obviously objectionable, since we do not know 
in advance what M is. But it should be clear from the earlier discussion 
3. Eckhardt (1997, fn. 8) mentions this distribution as a possible "doomsday" prior. 
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that the lottery assumption 2 is quite different. It requires only that 
conditional on the assumption that exactly M people will be born before 
the coming of Doom, I ought to assign a subjective probability of 
1IM for my having birth rank between 1 and M, and probability zero 
for any higher birth rank. In this case, my subjective probability is a 
mixture of probabilities conditional upon different numbers of people 
being born before doom. There is nothing incoherent about this as- 
sumption, and this is all that Leslie needs to make the argument work. 
Some might argue that even if Eckhardt is wrong about the impos- 
sibility of a lottery assumption, nevertheless the flaw lies in the unjus- 
tifiability of the lottery prior distribution, i.e., assumption 2. We dis- 
agree. Granted, one can always criticize any choice of priors. We wish 
to emphasize, however, that the Doomsday Argument is a sufficiently 
interesting result if it can be shown to succeed for a class of well- 
motivated prior distributions, namely 'lottery' priors consistent with 
assumptions 1 and 2. Unlike some critics of the Doomsday Argument, 
we accept that the lottery priors are well-motivated. In particular, the 
assumption 2 is permissible because it does not require a uniform mea- 
sure over hypotheses about birth order, which would be ruled out by 
countable additivity. Furthermore, the lottery priors are based on the 
intuitively plausible idea that none of us is special with respect to birth 
rank. Thus, the argument as presented is much more interesting than 
the mere assertion that a shift in favor of early doom occurs for some 
(possibly implausible) choices of priors. 
Leslie does maintain (1996, 203) that the Doomsday Argument re- 
quires nothing more than an application of Bayes's Theorem to our 
initial Doomsday probabilities. In fact, the formalized version of the 
argument just presented shows that the argument's success depends 
crucially upon the selection of a 'lottery' prior, i.e., a prior distribution 
consistent with assumptions 1 and 2. So a commitment to Bayes's The- 
orem does not by itself ensure the 'Doomsday shift'. Insofar as he 
allows great latitude in assigning the prior probabilities P(D) but ap- 
pears to regard the 'lottery' prior as the only natural choice, Leslie's 
views are less stringent than those of logical probabilists such as Keynes 
or Carnap, but more stringent than those of pure subjective Bayesians. 
What, then, is the problem with the Doomsday Argument? The first 
step is to realize that a small, but ultimately significant, modification 
should be made for the lottery assumption to be legitimate. Observe 
that assumptions 1 and 2 entail that I exist (with probability 1). The 
assumption E that I exist is just i c-j i.e., my birth rank is less than 
or equal to the index of doom. More formally, E is equivalent to 
Vi:jBi * Dj. Assuming the possibilities Bi are exclusive, assumption 2 
entails that 
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P(EIDj) = z P(BilD) = 1 
i=l 
for each j. Combining this with assumption 1 yields P(E) = 1. 
Now the Doomsday Argument is supposed to rest on the intuition 
that "I am nobody special"; but surely the fact that I exist is extraor- 
dinary just as extraordinary, in the lottery analogy, as finding that I 
happen to be one of the lucky people who have a lottery ticket. We 
should modify our assumptions to allow for the possibility that I might 
never have existed. We can do this by making the two assumptions 
conditional on E: 
1' Xy 1P(DjlE) = 1 
2' For each j and each i ] j, P(BilDj E ) = 1/j; if i > j, then 
P(BiIDj E) = 0. 
This step is innocuous in one sense, since if the assumptions 1 and 
2 are true and we take our existence for granted, then the modified 
versions 1' and 2' must also be true. The main advantage of the mod- 
ification is that the assumptions remain plausible even if we allow for 
the possibility of our own non-existence (i.e., P(E) =# 1). This lets us 
carry out the Doomsday Argument even in this more general case. 
Replacing (1), we have 
00 
P(BJIE) = E (l1j)P(Dj1E). (2) 
j=i 
The Bayesian shift must now be seen not as a relation between the 
absolute prior P(Dj) and P(DjIBI), but rather as relating P(Dj1E) and 
P(DjlBi E ). For i c j, we have: 
P(DjIBi B E) _ P(BiIDj . E) 
P(DjIE) P(BJlE) (3) 
_ (lj) 
P(BJIE). 
3.2 Critique. If the lottery distribution is plausible given the infor- 
mation that I exist, and if the ensuing model entails a massive shift in 
favor of 'doom sooner', then where is the flaw in the Doomsday Ar- 
gument? We suggest that the flaw lies in ignoring the fact that there is 
an earlier, equally massive shift in favor of 'doom later' that occurs 
when we first conditionalize upon the information that we exist. This 
shift from P(Dj) to P(DjIE) virtually cancels out the second 'Doomsday 
shift' from P(DjIE) to P(DjlBi * E); the reason for the qualifier "vir- 
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tually" will shortly be made precise. We will refer to these successive 
probabilities as the 'initial', 'intermediate', and 'final' probabilities of 
Dj. Note that the intermediate probability P(DjIE) is the posterior 
probability of the first shift and the prior probability of the second. 
To begin with, note that the derivation of (3) goes through equally 
well if we impose an upper bound M on the number of humans that 
might ever be born. We can let Mbe as large as we please for instance, 
a generous estimate of the number of elementary particles in the uni- 
verse times a generous estimate of the number of seconds between the 
big bang and the heat death of the universe. In this case, we need only 
replace assumption 1' with M 1 P(DjIE) = 1 and restrict assumption 
2' to cases where the conditional probability is well defined, i.e., where 
j ? M. Imposing such a cap simplifies much of the mathematics; we 
will remove this restriction in Section 3.3. 
Let us return to the case of the lottery of unknown size. It might 
help to think instead of the "Publishers Clearing House Awards" that 
we all receive occasionally, though imagine that the award notices are 
numbered. Here, the analogue of the proposition E that I exist is the 
proposition that I receive a notice. If I discover that I have received 
such a notice, then the probability for finding any particular number 
on the notice is given by the distribution (2). That conclusion is sup- 
ported by the thought that I should treat myself as no different from 
anybody else as regards my chance of receiving any particular notice. 
I can also ask for my prior probability of receiving such a notice at 
all, if an unknown number of notices have been mailed out. Employing 
the same reasoning, this probability should depend solely upon the size 
of the "Publishers" lottery and the size of the population (i.e., the max- 
imum number of people who could possibly receive a notice). If the 
total population is M, and as before Dj signifies a lottery of sizej, then 
P(EID1) = jIM. So my prior probability P(E) of receiving a notice is 
given by 
M 
P(E) = E P(EID1)P(Dj) j=1 
M 
E (IMP(D1). j=1 
It follows from Bayes's Theorem that for i ' j, 
P(DjIE) P(EID1)P(Dj) 
P(Dj) P(E)P(Dj) 
_ P() 
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This will obviously be much higher for large values of j. When we 
put this together with the calculation (3), we can see that the two shifts 
virtually cancel out if we learn both that we have a notice and that its 
number is i: 
P(DjIBi  ) - P(DjIBi L E) P(DjIE) 
P(D1) P(DjIE) P(D1) 
(llj/) (i1 (4) 
P(Bi IE) P(E) 
=1 
MP(Bi * E) 
which is independent of j. 
None of this is surprising. Imagine that we start with some notion 
of how many "Publishers Clearing House" award notices are sent out 
in a typical mailing. When we find an award notice in the afternoon 
mail, our natural reaction is to revise the initial estimate upwards: it 
seems unlikely that we would have received anything unless the mailing 
list was huge. But we then discover a relatively low number on our 
notice, and revise our estimate downwards. The two revisions virtually 
cancel out, leaving us with no more information than that at least as 
many people received notices as the number printed on ours.4 
Back to the Doomsday Argument. Here, the intermediate proba- 
bilities P(DjIE) (which serve as the priors in Leslie's argument) involve 
conditionalizing on my being alive, but not on my being alive 'now' 
with birth rank i. In such a scenario, our contention is that we ought 
indeed to assign tiny intermediate probabilities to early doom. It seems 
queer to talk this way, since it requires us to imagine ourselves in a 
position where we first have initial subjective probabilities of the form 
P(D1), and then revise them upon learning that we actually exist (while 
still ignorant of when we exist). The prior probabilities are ones we 
literally could never have had unless we take seriously the possibility 
of Cartesian doubts about our own existence (though not seriously 
enough to worry about whose priors are then at issue). 
The difficulty here is the well-known problem of 'old evidence' for 
Bayesian confirmation theory: if I have known some proposition E all 
along, then conditionalizing on it cannot change the probability of 
another proposition H. Therefore, E cannot serve as evidence for or 
4. Our thanks to Bernie Linsky for pointing out the analogy to this sort of phenomenon. 
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against H. One line of response to this problem, suggested by Howson 
and Urbach (1989, 270-271), is to understand the evidential bearing 
of E upon H in terms of conditionalization upon E using some hypo- 
thetical prior probability distribution that does not assign to E a prob- 
ability of one. This is precisely what we are doing here with the initial 
probability distribution P(D). 
We do not pretend to have shown that the use of hypothetical priors 
solves the problem of old evidence to complete satisfaction, but we 
make two observations. First, ad hominem, Leslie himself seems to en- 
dorse a solution to the problem of old evidence along these lines (1996, 
218ff.). Second, even if some such solution to the problem of old evi- 
dence does not work, that does not undermine our argument. If no 
solution to the problem of old evidence is in the offing, then Bayesian 
confirmation theory will be inadequate for capturing relations of evi- 
dential bearing. Our contention is that our being alive at all does have 
evidential bearing upon the number of people that will ever live. This 
may be true regardless of whether the relevant notion of evidential 
bearing is captured in Bayesian terms. 
Here is a 'just-so story' that might ground our hypothetical initial 
probability distribution. There is a large number (M) of souls in 
heaven, and they are all patiently waiting in line to be embodied down 
on earth. Until my soul is embodied, I have no idea where it is in line. 
After person j is born, there is a possibility that doom will enshroud 
the earth, and no more souls will be embodied. We do not know when 
this will happen, but we have certain subjective probabilities P(D1). 
The processes that determine when doom will occur are independent 
of those that determine where my soul is in line. Thus, the crucial 
assumptions about initial probabilities are the following, where as 
usual Dj means doom after the j'th person is born, and B, means that 
my birth rank (or position in line) is i. 
1.XL 1P(D) = 1, i.e., doom happens eventually. 
2. P(Bi) = 1IM: I am equally likely to be assigned any position in 
line. 
3. P(Bi * D) = (1IM)P(D): my position in line and the coming of 
doom are independent. 
Given the representation for E cited earlier, these assumptions 
ground the 'lottery' distribution. We have, for i ' j, 
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P(BJIE DJ) = P(B. E Dj) P(E . Dj) 
P(Bi* DJ) 
P(E DJ) 
(IIM)P(Dj) (5) 
Di= I P(Bi - DJ) 
(1IM)P(D1) 
(IMP(D1) 
= llj. 
So this imaginary set-up permits reasoning analogous to that which 
leads to (4) in the lottery case. The conclusion is the same: the two 
shifts virtually cancel out. All that happens when I conditionalize on 
both my existence and my early birth rank is that the 'probability sur- 
plus' that arises from finding out that Doomsday has not happened yet 
is divided proportionately among all the remaining Doomsday hy- 
potheses. In other words, the probabilities of the unfalsified Doomsday 
hypotheses are renormalized so that they sum to one. It is this pro- 
portionate shift that we wish to signify when we say that the two shifts 
virtually cancel out. 
The 'just-so' story is not intended as a serious piece of metaphysics 
or theology, of course, but rather as a way of making graphic a certain 
sort of hypothetical probability distribution P(DJ) that reflects the pos- 
sibility that we might never have existed. Leslie's argument begins with 
priors of the form P(DjIE). We have shown that there is a clear sense 
in which these 'priors' ought to already reflect a massive shift toward 
'doom far' hypotheses. 
Leslie does consider this sort of objection: 
The bigger our race is in its temporal entirety, the more opportu- 
nities there are of being born into it. This counterbalances the 
greater unlikelihood of being born early. (1996, 225) 
To counter the objection, he considers an extreme case. God tosses a 
coin; on a result of heads, he creates ninety million people, one of whom 
is named 'Dr. Black', and on a result of tails, he creates just one person 
named 'Dr. Green'. On the reasoning above, upon learning that you 
exist, you ought to favor the hypothesis that the coin landed heads. 
But, Leslie argues, you surely ought to bet that you are Dr. Green 
rather than Dr. Black. 
This response misses the point, as it fails to take account of the 
possibility that you might not have existed. It assumes, for example, 
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that if the coin lands tails, then not only would Dr. Green exist, but 
you would be Dr. Green. If instead we imagine that there are ninety 
million plus one souls waiting for the result of the coin toss, ninety 
million hoping for heads and one lonely soul hoping for tails, then the 
fact of your existence makes it almost a certainty that the result of the 
toss was heads, and a straightforward calculation shows that you have 
an equal chance (1/90,000,001) of being Dr. Green or Dr. Black. 
3.3 Removing the Cap. The argument of the preceding section pre- 
supposed an a priori cap on the possible size of the human population. 
Nothing in Leslie's argument prohibits the imposition of such a cap: 
the shift in favor of early doom hypotheses was supposed to follow 
from Bayes's theorem, supplemented only by assumptions 1' and 2' 
above. Nonetheless, it is worth exploring the consequences of removing 
the cap for Leslie's argument. It turns out that if we remove the cap, 
the argument of the previous section can no longer go through.5 In 
particular if we make the following assumptions: 
1. P(B< * D) = P(BI)P(D), and 
2. P(B19E * D) = 1/j, for i c j, 
then it follows that the P(B1) are all equal, in violation of countable 
additivity. So we cannot find an initial probability measure according 
to which birth rank and timing of doom are independent, and which 
yields the lottery distribution as an intermediate distribution. Put an- 
other way, we can find initial probability distributions, those that yield 
the lottery distribution as an intermediate, such that my being born 
with rank i does have evidential bearing upon the timing of Doom. 
Of course, one can always choose an initial probability distribution 
such that anything can count as evidence for anything else we choose 
(except elevating an initial probability of zero or lowering an initial 
probability of one). The mere existence of such distributions does not 
itself prove very much. The question is: which initial distributions are 
sufficiently well-motivated to merit serious attention? We know some- 
thing of the candidates: we can have initial probabilities satisfying as- 
sumption 1 or assumption 2, but not both. How seriously should we 
take candidates that satisfy 2 but not 1? As noted earlier, the lottery 
distribution has appeal on the grounds of symmetry. On the other 
5. Note also that the argument does not go through for all capped distributions, just 
those satisfying the further constraints described above. But again: Leslie's argument 
was supposed to follow from Bayes's theorem together with assumptions 1' and 2' 
alone, and not to require further assumptions about the structure of the relevant dis- 
tribution. Thanks to Peter Vranas for discussion on this point. 
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hand, any initial probability that satisfies assumption 2 will yield some 
version of the Doomsday Argument, a consequence most people find 
extraordinarily counterintuitive. Starting with an initial probability 
that satisfies condition 1 will allow us to sidestep the Doomsday Ar- 
gument, although we will have to forego the lottery distribution. That 
may not be so bad no worse, perhaps, than giving up an infinite lot- 
tery where each ticket is equally likely to win. One person's modus 
ponens is another's modus tollens. 
But before we find ourselves trapped by a false dichotomy, note that 
we can accept both assumptions 1 and 2 if we are willing to give up 
countable additivity. Perhaps the simplest way to do this would be to 
use a non-standard measure. If we let M stand for some infinite-or 
more precisely, hyperfinite-integer, and let P be a hyperfinitely ad- 
ditive measure yielding non-standard values on an outcome space gen- 
erated by events of the form Bi * Dj, where 1 c i, j c M, then the 
derivation of the previous section remains valid.6 This would allow us 
to remove the finite cap on the size of the population, while retaining 
the virtual cancellation of the shifts resulting from the 'discoveries' that 
I exist, and that my birth rank is i. 
4. Conclusion. Given that we exist, our existence now does indeed favor 
'Doom sooner' over 'Doom later'. On the other hand, we might not 
have existed at all, and our existence favors 'Doom later'. In the sim- 
plest cases, these two effects cancel one another out, yielding the happy 
result that our existence now tells us nothing whatsoever about the 
coming of Doom, except that it has not yet happened. Two factors 
have helped to obscure this rather straightforward remedy to our anx- 
ieties about Doom. First, we never actually have subjective probabili- 
ties in which our existence is not taken as a given. This is just a version 
of the familiar problem of old evidence. Second, an interesting range 
of cases are not 'the simplest'. Yet even in these more complex cases, 
where there is no upper bound on the possible size of the human popu- 
lation, Bayes's theorem in no way compels us to regard our present 
existence as evidence for the imminence of doom. 
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